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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
force a choice between the legalistic and economic approaches as the
conflict between the views would be irreconcilable.
NATHANIEL

G. SIms.

Trade Regulation-Right of Patentee to Control Patented
Article after It Has Passed into the Hands of a Purchaser.
Plaintiff granted a license "to manufacture . ..and sell only for
radio amateur reception, radio experimental reception, and radio broadcast reception.. ." certain patented apparatus known as a vacuum-tube
amplifier, the patents to which were held by a patent pool to which the
plaintiff and other large electrical companies belonged. Pursuant to
the license agreement, the licensee attached to each amplifier it sold a
plate bearing the legend: "Licensed only for Radio Amateur, Experimental and Broadcast Reception.... -"
Defendant purchased many amplifiers from the licensee with this
license notice attached and used them in talking motion picture equipment. At the time of the sales the defendant knew that the license did
not contemplate his intended use, and the licensee knew that defendant's
intended use was not authorized by the patentee. The present suit was instituted against the defendant charging infringement of the patents under
which the amplifiers were manufactured and sold by the licensee. The
lower courts held the patents valid and infringed by defendant, 2 and the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed8 their decree, Mr. Justice
Black dissenting.
An analysis of the nature of the right conferred by the Patent
Statute 4 shows that the patentee does not, by virtue of the Act, acquire
the right to make, use, or vend the patented article, these being merely
common law rights. existing in any owner of chattels. The only addition
afforded to these rights by the patent law is the power to exclude all
other persons from making, using, or vending the invention or discovery. 5 The grant of this exclusive right does not mean that it must
be exercised; the article may be wholly withdrawn from the market,8
'Western Electric Co. v. General Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293,
297 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
'Western Electric Co. v. General Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293
(S. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd, 91 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
3 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., - U. S. -, 58 Sup.
Ct. 849, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 843 (1938). Affirmed on rehearing in a five to two
decision, U. S. Sup. Ct., Nov. 21, 1938, Justices Black and Reed dissenting.
'Rx
,v. STAT. §4884 (1875) as amended 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35 U. S. C. A.
§40 (Supp. 1938) gives the patentee the exclusive right to make, use and vend his

invention or discovery.

r See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 549, 14 L. ed. 532, 537 (U. S.
1852).
8

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 Sup.

Ct 748, 52 L. ed. 1122 (1908).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
or the patentee may license one to make,7 another to use,8 and still
another to vend the patented article.9 But as the patentee's right to
make, use, and vend such article is grounded upon the common law,
with only negative powers added by the statute, and would not without the statute be beyond the control of state legislation, it is subjected to the police regulations of the state, 10 the law of public service,1 '
12
and the criminal law.
At common law, any attempt to limit the price or use of a chattel
by notice to the purchaser or subpurchaser was held void' 3 as contravening the public policy in favor of the free alienation of chattels. 14
Although the earlier common law doctrine has been substantially modified, the public interest is still the first consideration; and any restraint
of trade, in order not to be declared void as against public policy, must
be shown to be reasonable both as to the public and the parties, and
must be limited to what is fairly necessary in the circumstances of the
particular case. 15
There have been atte.mpts by patentees to place numerous and varied
types of restraints on the use and resale of patented articles. These
might be roughly divided into four classes, the first of which is attempted restrictions on the time of use. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that an assignment of the right to make, use or
vend the patented article only during the original term of the patent
carries with it the right to continue such making, using, and vending
'United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192, 71

L. 8ed.
362 (1926).
Rubber
Wheel & Tire Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. 358 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1907).
'Dorsey Revolving Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. Cas. No. 4,015 (C.
C. N. D. N. Y. 1874).
"' Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. ed. 1115 (1879) (In this case
the patentee of certain oil was obliged to conform to state regulations as to public
safety.)
'Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399,
7 Atl. 809 (1887) (which held that even though a telephone company furnished
service by means of patented telephones, it could not refuse this service to the
public).
'Vannini v. Paine, 1 Harr. 65 (Del. 1833) (state can forbid the use of a
patented lottery device).
" Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886).
See Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 39 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) where the court,
through Lurton, Judge, said: "The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints on alienation have
generally been regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by
great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand." This passage
is quoted with approval by Mjr. justice Hughes in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 404, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 384, 55 L. ed. 502, 518
(1911). See also GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF PROPRTv (2d ed. 1895)
§§27, 28.
I Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376,
55 L. ed. 502 (1911).
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during any extension or renewal of the patent,18 and the Court has
repeatedly held that a purchase of such article from the patentee during the original term of the patent entitles the purchaser to continue to
have the right to use it beyond the life of both the patent and its
renewals.' 7 An inference from these holdings is that an attempted
arbitrary, or period of time, limitation would be likewise invalidated.
The second class might be termed attempted restrictions on the
locality in which the patented article is to be sold or used. The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that such attempted limitations are
not cognizable under the patent law after the patented articles have
passed by sale into the channels of trade. And where the patentee has assigned the right to sell his patented article for use only in a certain
territory, as between assignees of different territories, it is competent
for one to sell the article to persons who intend, with the knowledge
of the vendor, to take them for use into the territory of the other. The
purchaser acquires the right to use it anywhere, without reference to
other assignments of territorial rights by the same patentee.' 8
The third class is attempted restrictions on resale prices. There
have been several decisions in the lower federal courts 19 which upheld
price restrictions on resale, but in later cases the United States Supreme
Court definitely decided that the fact that an article is patented confers
on the patentee no right to restrict the price on resale.2 0
'"Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646, 11 L. ed. 1141 (U. S. 1846); Simpson v.
Wilson, 4 How. 709, 11 L. ed. 1169 (U. S. 1846).
"'Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 549, 14 L. ed. 532, 537 (U. S. 1852)
(where the court distinguished between the grant of the right to make and vend
the patented article and the grant of the right to use it, saying: "In using it, he
[the purchaser] exercises no rights created by the Act of Congress, nor does he
derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive privilege granted to the
patentee. Th4 inventor might lawfully sell to him. .. .And when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the
monopoly.") In Bloomer v. Millinger, 1 Wall. 340, 17 L. ed. 581 (U. S.
1864), followed by Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544, 21 L. ed. 322 (U. S.
1873), the Court held that the purchaser of a patented article has the right to continue using his purchase after the original term has expired, during the extension
of the patent, and until the machine is worn out.
'Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453, 21 L. ed. 700 (U. S. 1873); Hobbie v.
Jennison, 149 U. S.355, 13 Sup. Ct 879, 37 L. ed. 766 (1893) ; Keeler v. Standard
Folding Bed Co., 157 U. S.659, 15 Sup. Ct. 738, 39 L. ed. 848 (1895). Accord:
Jackson v. Vaughan, 73 Fed. 837 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1896) ; cf. Boesch v. Graff,
133 U. S.697, 10 Sup. Ct. 378, 33 L. ed. 788 (1890). Contra: Hatch v. Adams,
22 Fed. 434 (C.C. E. D. Pa. 1884) ; California Electrical Works v. Finck, 47 Fed.
583 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1891).
"'International Pavement Co. v. Richardson, 75 Fed. 590 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1896); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 7th,
1903); Commercial Acetylene Co.v. Autolux Co., 181 Fed. 387 (C. C. E. D. Wis.
1910).
tm
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct.
376, 55 L. ed. 502 (1911) ; Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 57
L. ed. 1041 (1913); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490, 37
Sup. Ct. 412, 61 L. ed. 866 (1917); Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.,
246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct 257, 62 L. ed. 551 (1918); United States v. General
Electric Co., 272 U. S.476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192, 71 L. ed. 362 (1926)

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The fourth class of attempted restrictions under the Patent Statute
is restrictions on the kind of use of the patented article. It appears
that the unconditional sale of a patented article carries with it as a
matter of law the permission to use freely,2 1 and it is this permission,
and not the passing of title, which gives the purchaser the right to an
unrestricted use of the article, and takes it out of the patent monopoly.
Should an unlicensed person manufacture a patented article, the mere
fact that he had title to the materials would avail him nothing unless
he had, in addition, the permission of the patentee to make and use
such article. The difficulties of interpretation of the Patent Act, which
has not been materially changed since 1790,22 may be traced to the
alleged power of the patentee to divide and subdivide under the patent
law the use of the patented article after sale. As the physical properties
of the invention were dissociated from the use of it, the idea was conceived that the patentee might pass the title to such physical properties in a patented article with no right to use, and then apportion the
use of the article, with the right to use in a specified way, at a specified
time, or for a specified purpose, to various holders of the physical property rights to such article. An attempt was made to accomplish this
object by attaching "license notices" to the article, under the protection
of the Patent Act. It would appear that the error in this theory is that
the Patent Act does not give any power to divide or subdivide the use
of the article upon sale, but only the right to the exclusive use of the
article, and the validity of any such power of subdivision must depend
upon the general law, and not upon the Patent Act. Recognition of this
erroneous theory, however, was given in a line of cases originating
with Heaton-PeninsularButton-Fastner Ca. v. Eureka Specialty Co. 2 3
This line of decisions reached its culmination in the case of Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co.,24 in 1912, when the Supreme Court approved the entiie
doctrine of restriction by notice, reasoning that as the public is always
free to take or refuse the patented article on the terms imposed, the
patented article will find no market if the conditions be too onerous; and
that the public, by permitting the article to go unused, loses nothing
which it had before. The reasoning continued that as the patentee
might entirely withhold his patented article from the market, he likewise had the right to withhold any part of it. The trouble with this
-"Hartshorn v. Day, 19 How. 211, 15 L. ed. 605 (U. S. 1857) semble.
1 STAT. 109 (1790) with which compare 35 U. S. C. A. §40 (Supp. 1938).
77 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) ; Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair,
123 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903); National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128
Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904). For a collection of these cases, see Montague,
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Patent Law (1912) 21 YALE L. J. 432.
2224 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364, 56 L. ed. 645 (1911) (Here, by a four to three
decision, the notice requiring the patentee's unpatented ink and supplies to be used
with the patented mimeograph was held effective and its violation construed as an
infringement.)
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reasoning is that, if anything, it proves too much. If it is true that
merely because a man may withhold a patented article from the market,
he may therefore impose any conditions upon its use when he sells,
it should be equally true that if a man owns something which he need
not sell, he may when he sells, likewise, place any restrictions on its
future use. But the entire question was re-examined in Motion Pictures
Patents Co. v.Universal Film Mfg. Co.,25 where the Dick case was
expressly overruled, and the Court said that patent statutes do not provide for any such notice and that the patentee can derive no aid from
them. The Court said of the Patent Act, about which the judges
in the Dick case wrestled so profoundly, "The words . . . are few,
simple, and familiar . ..and their meaning would not $eem doubtful
if we can avoid reading into them that which they really do not contain."28 This commentary on the judicial controversy which had raged
about the very meaning of the statute which the Court in the Motion
Pictures Patents case styled as plain, simple, and devoid of difficulty,
is an unusual example of frankness in overruling previous cases.
Thus, it would seem the Supreme Court of the United States
had committed itself to the policy of denying to patentees the right to
restrict, in any way, the price or use of their patented article after sale.
In the principal case the Court asserts that its conclusion that defendant infringed the patent is based, in part at least, on the fact that
defendant "was not a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade."2.7
But the same Court said in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co.
that any article sold becomes: "an article of commerce, and the rules
concerning the freedom of trade must be held to apply to it."128
Finally, it seems that the Court overlooked the distinction between
the relationship of patentee and licensee, where broad reservations of
rights to patentees have been permitted, and the relationship of patentee
or licensee and purchaser, where no reservations of any kind have been
allowed to stand.
HARRY MCMULLAN,

JR.

Z243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 61 L. ed. 871 (1917).
243 U. S. 502, 510, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 418, 61 L. ed. 871, 876 (1917).
= See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., - U. S. -,
58 Sup. Ct 849, 851, 82 L. ed. Adv. Op. 843, 846 (1938).
1220 U. S. 373, 408, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 385, 55 L. ed. 502, 519 (1911); see
Coca Cola Co. v. State, 225 S. W. 791, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (where the
court said of the status of a patented article after its sale: "Having parted with
his ownership therein, it enters the channels of trade as an article of commerce,
and is thereafter beyond his (the patentee's] control.")

